Beaucage v Métis Nation of Ontario, 2019 ONSC 633

Motion granted. The nature of the Métis Nation of Ontario’s responsibilities and relationship with the government, does not transform the private voluntary organization’s membership decisions into public law decisions that are subject to judicial review.

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The Métis Nation of Ontario (“MNO”) has moved to quash this application for judicial review on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction. The underlying application for judicial review sought an order to set aside the decision of a genealogist, that denied the applicant’s appeal from earlier decisions that refused his application for membership in the MNO. The applicant’s mother and sister became registered citizens of the MNO in 2002. In 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) released its decision in R v Powley, [2003] 4 CNLR 321 (“Powley”). The SCC, although emphasizing that there is no universal definition of “Métis”, provided a framework for determining who is Métis for the purposes of s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Thereafter, a new definition of “Métis” was effectively adopted by the MNO. This application for judicial review does not relate to s 35 rights. When the new definition was implemented by the MNO, however, current citizens such as the applicant’s mother and sister were grandfathered and therefore did not need to meet the new requirements. New applicants, including family members as in this situation, however, must now meet the new requirements.

The test on a motion to quash an application for judicial review asks whether it is plain and obvious or beyond doubt that the judicial review application would fail (Adams v Canada (AG), 2011 ONSC 325 (“Adams”); Certified General Accountants Assn of Canada v Canadian Public Accountability Board (2008), 233 OAC 129 (Div Ct)). In this case, it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. As found in prior decisions, the Divisional Court has no jurisdiction under s 2 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act to judicially review any decision outside the public law sphere (Trost v Conservative Party of Canada, 2018 ONSC 2733; Adams; Deeb v Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada, 2012 ONSC 1014). The purpose of judicial review is to ensure the legality of state decision making (Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v Wall, 2018 SCC 26 (“Wall”). In Wall, the SCC underscored the importance of distinguishing between “public” in the generic sense and “public” in the public law sense. Broad public impact is insufficient to bring a decision within the public law sphere.

All corporations are creatures of statute. The corporation must be discharging public duties or exercising powers of a public nature before it is subject to judicial review (Knox v Conservative Party of Canada, 2007 ABCA 295). The MNO Act does not confer public duties on the MNO or delegate governmental responsibilities to it. The MNO Act and its history do not transform the decision at issue into a public law decision that is subject to judicial review. The MNO participates specifically on behalf of its citizens, not on the basis that it represents all Métis (“Powley”). Provincial and federal governments may accept an MNO card based on the MNO registry of citizens, but an MNO card is not an exclusive requirement. The MNO calls its members citizens but nothing turns on the use of that nomenclature.

Corneau v AG of Québec, 2018 QCCA 1172

Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre Case Watch

The test set out in R v Powley for Métis rights requires that a Métis community’s distinct nature be sought out, but does not require that the underlying practices and traditions be distinct.

This case involved an application brought against Mr. Corneau, and other alleged offenders, for occupying sites on public lands without any property right, lease or occupancy permit contrary to s.54 of The Act Respecting the Lands in the Domain of the State (“the Act”). Mr. Courneau contested the application on the basis that he belongs to a Métis community which confers rights to occupy the alleged public lands. It was held at trial that Mr. Corneau did not meet the requirements of the test set out in R v Powley for Métis rights. Mr. Corneau has appealed the decision, calling into question the trial court’s assessment of: (i) the evidence following the identification of the historic Métis community; (ii) the existence of a modern community; (iii) the appellants’ membership in the modern community and (iv) the period of control. In the end, the Québec Court of Appeal (“the Court”) dismissed the appeals and ordered that Mr. Corneau abandon the sites and return the premises to their former condition.

The Court began by reviewing the R v Powley decision, which clarified the test for identifying a Métis community’s rights. It first began by observing that the term Métis is not a matter of genetics, but rather of culture and identity. As articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”), the term Métis “does not encompass all individuals with mixed Indian and European heritage; rather it refers to distinctive peoples who, in addition to their mixed ancestry, developed their own customs, way of life and recognizable group identity”. Furthermore, a Métis community are “a group of Métis, with a distinctive collective identity, living together in the same geographic area.” The Court then identified the constitutionally protected Métis rights as those rights subsisting in Métis communities that emerged between first contact and the effective imposition of European control. The focus therefore is on rights that existed “post-contact”, for example after a particular Métis community arose, but also “pre-control”, or before it came under the effective control of European laws and customs.

The Court then reviewed the factual matrix as presented by the trial court. The trial court found the evidence adduced by the appellants to be insufficient to establish an identifiable historic Métis community that would allow mixed individuals to be distinguished from their biological authors. This was decided after consideration of the evidence presented by historians, genealogists and anthropologists. It was also the opinion of the trial judge that even if there was a historic community of Métis tied to the land in question, there was no modern community holding the right being claimed. Finally, in consideration of the personal circumstances of Mr. Corneau, the trial judge found the evidence of self-identification with a Métis community unconvincing. The trial court observed that: (1) Mr. Corneau’s self-identification occurred later in life and was driven by opportunism; (2) that his ancestral connection did not, on the balance of probabilities, belong to an historic Métis community; and that (3) the absence of a cultural tie between the Métis organizations and his ancestral Métis community suggest that there is not, on the balance of probabilities, sufficient evidence of the existence of the right claimed.

The Court then set out the standard of review as requiring a palpable and overriding error standard for questions of mixed fact and law. It noted that, as per R v Van der Peet, courts must not undervalue the evidence of Aboriginal claimants simply because there is no evidence conforming to the evidentiary standards of other areas of law, such as a private law torts case. It also cited Mitchell v MRN, which highlighted that while Aboriginal claims must still be established on the basis of persuasive evidence, their forms of evidence must also be afforded equal and due treatment.

In respect of issue (i) and (ii), the Court agreed with the trial court that there was no historic Métis community, but upheld the appellants’ contention that the trial court applied the test too strictly. The Court observed that the test, as applied by the trial court, takes for granted that the practise and traditions of the community in question must be distinct, while the SCC only required that the distinctive nature be sought out. Nonetheless, this error is not determinative, as it does not change the conclusion of the Court that there was no historic community holding rights to be claimed. Specifically, the Court agreed that the appellants’ expert witnesses failed to meaningfully question the evidence of historian Russel Bouchard. Evidence from Bouchard was relied on to build the claim that the individuals from mixed marriages between Euro-Canadians and Indians defended their diversity as a cultural and identity marker. The respondents, however, presented evidence suggesting that such marriages did not result in a distinct community, but rather integration into the already established Montagnais community and later into Euro Canada. In the end, the practices or traditions must also be proved. While the Court does not directly address the issues of whether there exists a modern Métis community, they are not required to as they have concluded that no historic community existed.

In respect of issue (iii), the Court held that the trial court erred in their comparison of the historic Métis community of Sault Ste Marie with the alleged historic Métis community of Domaine du Roy and Mingan Seignory. In particular, the Court held that the trial court’s strict application of the factors of density and proximity is inappropriate. As stated by the Court, “it is possible to imagine that members of a historic community could settle in several separate locations while forming a single regional unit.”  An historic community can be regional and nomadic.

In respect of issue (iv) the Court agreed with the trial court’s contention that control over the territory in question occurred between 1842 and 1850. Both the appellants and the respondents contest this finding. The appellants argued that the correct time period ought to be after 1856 when Aboriginal people were displaced following the creation of reserves, relying on primitive land surveys between 1843 and 1860, indicated in the installation of a municipal regime and administration of justice, to support this position. The Court found, however, that they failed to submit sufficient evidence to illustrate a palpable and overriding error on the part of the trial court.

The respondents argued that the trial court erred in analyzing the evidence based on the legal criterion for control. The Court dismissed this position on the basis that the expert evidence relied on by the respondents mis-categorized the Domaine du Roi territory as one governed by the seigneurial land grant system, under which control was established between 1733 and 1767. Under cross-examination it was revealed that no primary or secondary sources refer to Domaine du Roi as a secondary estate. Instead, the Domaine du Roi was preserved for the fur trade and no land grants were offered in respect of it and ended in 1842 when the government included a condition in a renewed lease of the Hudson’s Bay Company that the government could have the land surveyed and could settle colonists in any part of the Domaine suitable for agricultural colonization. Thus, the Court found that the evidence supported the approach taken by the trial court.

 

Gift Lake Métis Settlement v Alberta, 2018 ABQB 58

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The Applicants’ claim that the membership provisions in ss 75, 90 and 91 of the Métis Settlements Act of Alberta are invalid due to the principle interjurisdictional immunity, is dismissed.

The Métis Settlements Act of Alberta, Chapter M-14 (MSA) provides for limitations on settlement membership, including an automatic termination provision under which membership automatically terminates if a person voluntarily registers as an Indian under the Indian Act. The Applicants are three former members of the Gift Lake Métis Settlement, whose memberships were terminated after each voluntarily registered as an Indian under the Indian Act to access health benefits. They asked for a declaration that certain membership sections of the MSA, are, in pith and substance, laws in relation to “Indians or Lands reserved for the Indians” and therefore outside provincial legislative competence, under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity does not apply to the impugned membership provisions of the MSA as their pith and substance can be related to a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the Alberta legislature. Further, the impact of these provisions does not impair the core power of the federal government under s. 91(24). Also, there is no principled basis on which the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity would have applied only to the impugned sections. Because the membership provisions are integral to the operation and purpose of the legislation, had the doctrine applied, it would have applied to the whole MSA, rendering the MSA entirely inapplicable to Alberta’s Métis population. Consequently, this group would have lost the benefits and protections the MSA affords them. Additionally, it would have would have created a legislative vacuum, as there is no corresponding federal legislation that would fill the void.

Unlike Indians, with whom the Federal Crown made treaties and granted reservations and other benefits, the Métis communities were not given a collective reservation or land base. They also did not enjoy the protection of the Indian Act, or any equivalent. Under the Accord, the Alberta government granted the Métis Settlements General Council fee simple title to the lands now occupied by eight Métis communities and passed legislation, including the MSA to protect Métis rights.

The MSA contains membership eligibility and termination provisions. An Indian registered under the Indian Act is not eligible to apply for membership in the Métis community except in limited circumstances, none of which apply in this case. Further, s. 90(1)(a) provides that if a person voluntarily becomes registered as an Indian under the Indian Act, that person’s Métis settlement membership terminates. There has been an amendment to the MSA in 2004, making the automatic termination provisions of s. 90 subject to a Métis Settlements General Council Policy that “provides otherwise”. However, there has been no alternative provision policy made so far that would alter the automatic termination provisions. As well, at this time, there is no way for the Applicants to withdraw their registration under the Indian Act.

The MSA recognizes and promotes the preservation of the distinct Métis culture and identity apart from other Aboriginal groups. The impugned provisions are necessary to achieve this objective. These sections only act to exclude specific individuals from membership in settlements and its benefits that are established under the MSA. The settlements under the MSA are creatures of provincial statute and were created and operate independently of Parliament’s jurisdiction over Indians under s 91(24). The fact that Métis are now recognized as Indians under s 91(24) does not change this. Membership in these settlements is not determinative of whether or not an individual is Métis and one can still be legally considered Métis under the test developed in R v Powley.

CCAS v GH and TV, 2017 ONSC 742

Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre Case Watch

A mere claim that someone is “Native” is not enough for a court to consider that an Aboriginal child will be at a “disadvantage” when weighing legislative factors in child protection matters. There needs to be more evidence of what is important to the family, the child, and the Aboriginal community the child is said to be a member of.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton (the Society) sought an order for Crown wardship with no access regarding the child EDV, born […], 2015, who was apprehended at birth. The mother, GH, and the father, TV, were known to the Society since 2012 regarding protection issues with the couple’s older children. After the Society commenced a protection application regarding EDV on May 5, 2015, it decided to pursue a summary judgment motion in relation to that application in February 2016. It is then that the Respondent father, TV, argued that EDV is a Métis child, and that as such, he should be treated in the same manner as children who fall within the definitions of “Indian”, “Native person” and “Native child” under Ontario’s former Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) [the CFSA has since been replaced by the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) as of April 30, 2018]. All parties conceded that Métis children did not fall within the scope of those definitions as they stood at the time of the hearing, and that EDV therefore did not have “Indian” or “Native” status within the meaning of the CFSA.

TV alleged that the definitions of Indigenous identity in the CFSA violated s 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that they did not extend to Métis children. He sought an order pursuant to section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 declaring these invalid and a remedy pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter directing that EDV be treated as if he were an “Indian”, “Native person” or “Native child” for the purposes of these child protection proceedings. The Society did not take a formal position on the CFSA’s identity definitions, and it stated that it had in all material respects treated EDV as if he were “Indian” or “Native”. As well, the CFSA identified the cultural background and ethnicity of all children as an important factor in child protection proceedings, which was apparent from numerous provisions in the Act.

After considering many factors, including Gladue principles, the Court concluded it should not deal with abstract questions, especially in the context of a constitutional question. Absent a more complete record, the s 15 claim could not succeed. This may not have been the result if there were a fuller evidentiary record, but the issue in this case was too theoretical. When considering Gladue principles in sentencing matters, they do not on their own justify a different sentence for Aboriginal offenders, but provide the necessary context for understanding and evaluating the case-specific information presented by counsel. It is difficult to apply the context referred to in R v Gladue and R v Ipeelee to the disposition stage of a child protection hearing. The child protection court is directed to order in the best interests of a child. Taking judicial notice of the historical reasons that may have contributed to an Aboriginal parent’s current circumstances is less likely to be helpful to the child protection judge faced with the decision of whether to return a young child to the parent than it may be to a sentencing judge grappling with whether to order a custodial sentence and, if so, its duration.

As for the issue of EDV’s “Native” status, it was noted that the Métis Ontario coordinator of their Healthy Babies Healthy Children Program contacted the Catholic Children’s Aid Society in 2012. The representative told them that TV had self-reported that he was a member of the Métis Eastern Woodlands of Nova Scotia, and as a result of that self-report, she was working with this family. However, no one pursued the issue until 2016 when the matter came up for summary judgment before Justice Chappel, where the parties consented to a finding that the child was Métis. There were extensive efforts to serve and seek out the involvement of the Eastern Woodlands Métis of Nova Scotia. However, the response was that they were not going to participate, they did not have any placement options, and that they were supporting the plan of the Catholic Children’s Aid Society to have the child EDV adopted. Justice Chappel ordered that the child EDV be considered “Native” for the purposes of this and any other child protection application.

The Society made every effort to see if other Métis communities would participate in the litigation or provide the family with a placement option. No one came forward. TV never followed up on any suggestions given for obtaining assistance for his many issues. He did not describe his family background at all, or give any testimony about his Aboriginal background or any connections that he had or has in a Métis community other than his relatively brief contact with the Métis Ontario Healthy Babies Healthy Children Program. The Court stated that it had compassion toward and recognition of the importance of “Native” heritage and families but this special status does not equate to a blanket exemption from legislation carefully crafted to protect vulnerable and often damaged children. The paramount purpose of the CFSA is to promote the best interests, protection, and well-being of children. Where a person is directed in the Act to make an order or determination in the best interest of a child and the child is an “Indian” or “Native person”, the person shall take into consideration the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of “Indian” and “Native” culture, heritage and traditions, presevering the child’s cultural identity.

In SB and BRM v Children’s Aid Society of Algoma and Mississauga First Nation, the Court addressed an appeal from an order for Crown wardship without access to the parents. The position of the Band was that access should continue so as to maintain the child’s connection to her Aboriginal community and to avoid the long-term consequences of cultural dislocation and estrangement from her roots, including from her siblings who resided on the reserve. However, there must be evidence of the nature of the involvement of the child’s family in the “Native” community which is lacking in this case. The mere claim that someone is “Native” does not allow the Court to consider the relevant factors within the legislative scheme, without some evidence of what is important to the family, the child, and the Aboriginal community the child is said to be a member of.

The Court decided that it was in the best interest of EDV to be made a Crown ward with no access, the Society was directed to make every effort to ensure that any foster parent and/or adoptive placement was willing to educate the child on his Aboriginal heritage and culture, to expose the child to this culture on an age-appropriate basis and provide the child with knowledge of any governmental benefits available to the child as a result of his “Native” status.

Case Watch for November 2016

FROM OUR PUBLICATIONS DESK

Case Watch

The following decisions came across our desk over the past month:

Equality rights of Métis children & families in child protection

Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v GH, 2016 ONSC 6287: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice released a decision in a Crown wardship application where it was found that the definitions of “Indian”, “Native person”, and “Native child” in Ontario’s Child and Family Services Act were invalid on the basis that they unjustifiably infringe s 15 of the Charter. The Court found that the impugned definitions do not extend to all individuals who self-identify as being Aboriginal. In fact, all parties conceded that they do not extend to Métis children. The Court also found that the Act afforded significant special protections for individuals falling into these definitions at every stage of a child protection intervention. The Court recognized that all Aboriginal peoples, including Métis, have been subject to a legacy of prejudice, stereotyping, and disadvantage. With this context in mind, the Court determined that the definitions created distinctions based on the analogous ground of “Aboriginality without membership in a community designated as “Native” under the [Act]”. It also concluded that these distinctions created or perpetuated disadvantage for Métis children and their families due to their inability to access the special protections under the Act. In conducting this analysis, the Court noted that the Act clearly created these unfair and objectionable disadvantages on its face and this could be discerned through logical reasoning alone. There was no need for social science evidence and empirical data. As no s 1 argument was advanced, the infringement was not saved. A suspended declaration of invalidity was issued and it was ordered that the Métis child in this case be treated as if he were an Indian, Native person or Native child within the meaning of the Act.

Inadequate investigation of vote-buying allegations by INAC

Good v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 1272: The Federal Court released a decision allowing in part an application for judicial review of INAC’s dismissal of an election appeal under the Indian Act. The applicant first unsuccessfully sought to appeal the March 2014 election of the Red Pheasant First Nation through INAC based on allegations of misconduct by the electoral officer and corruption in the form of vote-buying. She then sought judicial review of INAC’s rejection of that appeal. However, a subsequent election had since taken place in March 2016. The Court found that INAC’s delegate erred by choosing to dispense with any investigation of the applicant’s vote-buying allegations and proceeding to dismiss the appeal on the basis that corruption had not been proven on a balance of probabilities. The Court noted that this approach appears to have become settled practice within INAC’s Elections Unit. While the Court was sympathetic to INAC’s desire to streamline its management of appeals, it had significantly changed the very nature of the appeals process in a manner tantamount to attempting to amend the law via internal policy. The Court took no issue with how the delegate addressed the issue of electoral officer misconduct, but found that the delegate’s refusal to investigate conflicting evidence on vote-buying was unreasonable, based upon an error of law and procedurally unfair. While these issues were moot due to the subsequent election, the Court exercised its discretion to deal with the central controversy between the parties as roughly 40% of First Nations hold elections under the regime at issue in this case.

Relevance of Aboriginal equity stake to remedy in consultation case –

Michipicoten First Nation v Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources and Forests), 2016 ONSC 6899: The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed an application for judicial review of provincial approvals for the Bow Lake Wind Farm Project on the shared traditional territory of the Michipicoten and Batchewana First Nations in northeastern Ontario. Michipicoten argued that the Crown breached its duty to consult and sought to quash the approvals, preclude further approvals until more consultation takes place, and have the court remain seized of remedies or order removal of the infrastructure, remediation of the lands, and costs. The Court noted that Michipicoten had inexplicably delayed several months in pursuing and perfecting its application for judicial review, which caused the proponent and Batchewana, which has a 50% interest in the project, serious harm. For this reason, the Court dismissed the application on its own motion. In the alternative, the Court went on to conclude that consultation was adequate as Michipicoten failed to provide any evidence of potential adverse impacts on its Aboriginal or treaty rights in spite of many requests to do so. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the remedy sought in terms of decommissioning the project was inappropriate. Michipicoten argued that a proponent’s commercial interests may not come into play in determining the balance of convenience in a consultation dispute between the Crown and an Aboriginal community. However, the Court found this principle inapplicable in this case since Batchewana would face irreparable harm if the relief sought was granted.

Validity of a Will under the Indian Act not providing for spouse –

Poitras v Khan, 2016 SKQB 346: The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench allowed an application for letters probate under a Will created pursuant the Indian Act. The testator met the man who became her husband and married him after she had already made her Will. Under provincial legislation, the testator’s spousal relationship would have automatically revoked her Will. However, the testator was a status Indian living on reserve and there was no such provision under the Indian Act to invalidate her Will automatically. Under the Indian Act, the Minister had the power to declare the Will void if it imposed hardship on persons to whom the testator had responsibility or was contrary to the interests of the band or the public. In this case, the Minister had referred the matter to the Court, conferring its power to declare the Will void on the Court. The testator’s husband, Mr. Khan, sought to invoke this power on the basis that he was not provided for in the Will. The Court confirmed the validity of the Will, but also noted that Mr. Khan could still potentially seek a claim for one half of the testator’s family property accrued from the date of marriage until death under provincial legislation.

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s jurisdictional limits re: Indian Act –

Beattie v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 1328: The Federal Court dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal where a complaint was dismissed as being solely a challenge to legislation beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The applicant, Mr. Beattie, sought to register two leases and an assignment of lease in the Indian Lands Registry. The Registrar rejected the applications on the basis that the leases did not include the Crown as a party and no ministerial approval had been provided. Since the leases could not be registered, the assignment could not be registered either. As a result of this decision, the applicants brought a complaint to the Tribunal alleging that the respondent had discriminated against them on the basis of their race, national or ethnic origin by denying a service customarily available to the public. The Tribunal dismissed the complaints on the basis that they were beyond its jurisdiction since they were challenging the Indian Act itself, which obliged the Registrar to reject the leases and assignment. The Court was satisfied that the Tribunal’s decision was reasonable and it was reasonable to rely on other Federal Court and Tribunal decisions where such challenges to legislation were dismissed as beyond the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Court also rejected the applicants’ assertion that title to the reserve lands at issue in this dispute were vested in an individual pursuant to either a Certificate of Possession or customary tenure.

Court’s duty to explicitly consider & inquire into Gladue factors –

R v Park, 2016 MBCA 107: The Manitoba Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from sentence for impaired driving and drug possession due in part to the sentencing judge’s failure to adequately consider Gladue factors. It was conceded that defence counsel during the sentencing hearing did not address Gladue factors other than to note that the accused was Aboriginal. No Gladue report was ordered. The Crown argued that defence counsel expressly waived the Gladue rights of the accused whereas counsel for the accused on appeal argued that the Court had a duty to make further inquiry when no advocacy was provided on Gladue factors during sentencing. The Court of Appeal found there was no express waiver in this case. Defence counsel at sentencing acknowledged there were Gladue factors but focused on other arguments. A waiver must be express and clear. Both defence and Crown counsel have an obligation to bring forward Gladue information. Where that does not happen, the Court may need to go further and has a duty to at least make further inquiries. The Court must also make explicit its consideration of Gladue factors and its determination that it has adequate information on those factors before it. It is unsatisfactory for both the offender and the public to have to infer such circumstances were properly considered. The sentencing judge failed to expressly confirm that Gladue factors were considered and failed to clarify defence’s reliance on Gladue, which in turn had an impact on the sentence. The sentence was varied.

No need for ‘linkage’ between Gladue factors & offence –

R v Predham, 2016 ABCA 371: The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from sentence with respect to convictions for driving while disqualified, breach of recognizance, failure to appear and possession of a stolen licence plate. The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred in failing to give appropriate weight to his Gladue factors, among other things. In particular, the appellant took issue with the sentencing judge’s reasons where it was suggested that Gladue factors were less relevant to the offence of driving while disqualified in the absence of alcohol, drugs or violence. The sentencing judge stated that there must be “some relationship between the Gladue factors and the offending in order for there to be that sort of linkage”. The Court of Appeal held that it was an error of law to require a linkage between Gladue factors and the offending conduct. The Court stated that it is also an error to carve out a certain category of offences as being immune from the Gladue analysis. The Court was also satisfied that the sentencing judge’s error influenced his ultimate decision. The sentence was varied.

Injunction against Cleveland baseball team’s name & logo denied –

Cardinal v Major League Baseball, 2016 ONSC 6929: The Ontario Superior Court issued its reasons for dismissing an urgent interim injunction application to restrain the Cleveland baseball team, Rogers Communications, and Major League Baseball (MLB) from displaying the team’s name or logo during a game in Toronto and while the underlying federal and provincial human rights complaints proceed. In the underlying complaints, the applicant, Douglas J. Cardinal, is alleging that the use of the team’s name and logo constitutes prohibited discrimination and harassment against him on the grounds of race, ancestry, colour, ethnic and national origins, and constitutes a publication or display intended to incite infringement of the Ontario Human Rights Code. The Court held that it had jurisdiction over the application, rejecting MLB’s argument that it ought to allow the United States Supreme Court to determine the underlying issues in this case based on principles of comity. The Court was also satisfied that the parties raised serious issues to be tried in terms of whether a service had been offered and whether the team’s name and/or logo offend the provisions of federal and Ontario human rights legislation, as well as the relevance of MLB’s freedom of expression to the dispute. However, the Court did not accept the applicant’s assertion that he would sustain irreparable harm if an injunction was not granted, noting that damages were available and disputes over use of the impugned name and logo have been ongoing for years. The Court noted that the applicant sought a change to the status quo and his last minute application, if granted, would materially prejudice the respondents. The issue of delay went to both the question or irreparable harm and the balance of convenience.

Settlement approved in Newfoundland & Labrador school claims –

Anderson v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 NLTD(G) 179: The Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court approved the terms of a $50 million settlement in a class action brought by Aboriginal individuals who attended schools, dormitories or orphanages in the province between 1949 and 1980. The plaintiffs claimed that Canada breached a fiduciary duty to the students who attended these facilities to protect them from actionable physical or mental harm. The Court was satisfied that the settlement was fair, reasonable, made in good faith, and in the best interests of the class as a whole. It was also satisfied that the fees and disbursements of the plaintiffs’ counsel were fair and reasonable. The settlement includes both General Compensation Payments for years that students resided at the facilities at issue, and Abuse Compensation Payments that depend on the harm individual students suffered. The settlement provides for a confidential paper-based claims process and Canada is committed to funding mutually agreeable commemoration and healing initiatives over and above its compensation funding.

Tax Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over tax assessment challenges –

Horseman v Canada, 2016 FCA 252: The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from a decision to strike the appellant’s claims as falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada. The appellant received a Notice of Assessment and Requirement to Pay $59,000.06 of outstanding GST. He initiated this Federal Court action for a declaration that the Requirement to Pay is null and void and contrary to the Indian Act, Treaty No. 8, and s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Court found that this challenge was properly characterized as an indirect challenge to a tax assessment, making it plain and obvious that the Tax Court had exclusive jurisdiction. The Tax Court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutional validity, applicability or operability of federal legislation and regulations and can issue remedies if a notice of constitutional question is properly served. It is also well-established that the Tax Court can determine claims under s 87 of the Indian Act over the applicability of tax requirements, or involving tax exemption claims under Treaty No. 8. Such assertions are properly tested in the Tax Court.

Provincial human rights tribunal’s jurisdictional limits re band store –

Dinsmore v Slenyah Store, 2016 BCHRT 176: The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal dismissed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in the area of employment on the basis of colour or race with respect to a business in Fraser Lake, British Columbia known as the Slenyah Store. The business was operated by the Stellat’en First Nation up until April 2014. The majority of its customers are status Indians who are able to purchase gas and cigarettes at tax exempt rates there. In 2013, the store was in serious financial difficulty. It was kept afloat via overdraft protection from Stellat’en and Stellat’en paid the store’s back taxes to get it out of its financial difficulties. In 2014, the store was incorporated to be operated at arm’s length through a limited partnership. As a result of these changes, all the store’s employees were laid off by Stellat’en and encouraged to reapply for positions with the limited partnership that would operate the store going forward. The Tribunal found that while the store was operated by Stellat’en it was an integral part of the First Nation’s overall governance and operations. Its purpose was to permit members to avail themselves of their tax-free status, it was financially integrated with the First Nation, its employees were employees of the First Nation, and its operations were continuously concerned with the status, rights and privileges of Stellat’en’s members. As a result, the store fell under federal jurisdiction and outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction while it was operated by Stellat’en. While operated at arm’s length through a limited partnership, however, the store was a provincial undertaking subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal went on to dismiss the complaint against both entities on the ground that it had no reasonable prospect of success if it were to proceed on its merits.

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This Case Watch blog post has been brought to you by the Native Law Centre in partnership with Pro Bono Students Canada – University of Saskatchewan

National Aboriginal Day Celebrations

 BY CHRISTINA GRAY

Photo Credit: Lynda Gray, Ts'msyen Author of First Nations 101.

Photo Credit: Lynda Gray, Ts’msyen author of First Nations 101.

This June 21st, 2016 is significant as it marks 20 years since National Aboriginal Day was instituted as a national holiday in Canada. This is the one day specifically for Aboriginal people (and non-Aboriginal) across Canada to come together and celebrate, share meals, stories, music, and partake in cultural activities ranging from salmon feasts, canoeing to listening to throat singing.

Aside from being National Aboriginal Day, June 21st is also the summer solstice. It’s the longest day of the year and the shortest night of the year. This year we were fortunate enough to see the Strawberry Moon where the moon shone bright pink. It’s naturally a day to spend time in the warmth of the sunshine and celebrate the earth’s rotation in bringing us a renewed wealth of life.

People from all walks of life on June 21st come together to recognize our diverse cultures. In cities it can often feel stifling or invisible to be an Aboriginal person with distinct legal traditions, culture, history, and a distinct past. One that includes a lot of cultural and legal strengths, but that is often fraught with continued difficulties.

This last year the Truth and Reconciliation Commission formally closed in Ottawa with the release of their Final Report and Calls to Action. The closing of the TRC ended their 5-year mandate as part of the “truth telling and reconciliation process” in response to the Indian Residential School legacy.

At the TRC closing there was a lot of good energy shared between people. There was a walk for reconciliation, workshops, musical performances, art exhibits, and informal drumming and dancing that happened in the streets and hotel foyers. That energy will never be forgotten and neither will the residential schools’ dark legacy. This day is part of recognizing the truth-telling that happened through the TRC.

On my way home, I had a conversation with my mom about the good energy that I felt from attending the closing ceremonies. I left Ottawa with a renewed sense of who I am as an Aboriginal person living in a big city. I had time to reflect and find strength from being with survivors and allies. Attending the TRC was truly an internal and external reconciliation with Canada’s residential school legacy.

On June 22nd, there will another opportunity to build relationships, reconcile, and celebrate who we are as Aboriginal people in Canada. Over 300 school children, Aboriginal people, and community members will be doing just that at the Walk for Reconciliation at Saskatoon’s Victoria Park at 10am. This walk is to commemorate the one year that has passed since the TRC’s closing and for people to “rock your roots”. Let’s continue that good energy that was felt at the TRC’s closing and be proud of our distinct heritage, be it Mayan from Oaxaca, Dene, or Cree!

About the Author: Christina Gray is legally trained and works in Publications at the University of Saskatchewan’s College of Law, Native Law Centre of Canada. A first people of the Ts’msyen of Lax Kw’alaams, Dene from Lutsel K’e, and Red River Metis.